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White lies and black lies: What they
have in common and how they di er
written by Janina Steinmetz & Ann-Christin Posten
edited by Emir Efendic
Black lies, or telling a lie to gain a personal bene t, are universally
condemned. In contrast, white lies, or telling a lie to please another person,
are seen as an innocent part of everyday interactions. Does that mean that
white lies have no negative consequences? We discuss the origins and
consequences of black lies and white lies, and point out the potentially ugly
side of white lies.     
In everyday life, people sometimes tell “black lies”, and sometimes “white lies”. For
both types of lies (or deceptioni), the deceiver communicates misleading
information to another person or group namely the deceived [1]. However, a
large di erence exists between black lies and white lies: With black lies, the
deceiver tries to gain something at the cost of the deceived. In other words, the
deceiver exploits the deceived out of self-interest. A classic example is the
notorious used car dealer, who lies to customers about the state of the cars that
are for sale. Regarding white lies, the picture looks di erent: The deceiver lies to
please the deceived by using a liative deception. For example, most of us have
told a friend that their new hair-cut looks great to please and not irritate the
friend, while secretly disliking the hair-cut. Such deception out of a liative motives
means to lie in order to deepen a relationship, or to please the deceived by
saying what they would presumably like to hear.
Obviously, the deception in the two examples above stems from very di erent
motives, and therefore is usually met with condemnation in case of black lies,
versus a liation in case of white lies. But are white lies thus desirable and
without harm? In this article, we highlight that white lies can cause harm precisely
because people use them to foster relationships and a liation. More speci cally,
when people want to a liate with others, they tend to agree with all questions
and statements of others. Thereby, a liation biases response behavior, even on
neutral questions and even when nothing can be gained from the response.
Such a response bias can distort responses to health surveys, public policy
questionnaires, or eyewitness interrogations; in other words, white lies can cause
harm by undermining the e ectiveness of public policy or by incriminating
innocent others. To support this argument, we  rst review the underlying motives
of back lies versus white lies, and then illustrate how research on the prevention
of black lies might also be used to prevent the negative consequences of white
lies.
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Black lies
Deception is so common that not only humans, but even animals engage in it. For
instance, while apes often simply take food from weaker counterparts, they have
also been shown to employ deception. When they can steal food by reaching
through opaque instead of see-through tunnels, they often reach for the opaque
tunnels so that their competitors cannot detect their actions [2, 3]. These cases
of deception are exploitative, as the deceiving apes strategically mislead their
counterparts for personal bene ts (e.g., tasty food). But what determines
whether or not people (and apes) engage in such black lies?
An obvious factor that in uences whether people deceive is whether they think
that they will get caught [4]. For example, low chances of being detected increase
deception of taxpayers [5, 6]. Such behavior is rational, as being detected reduces
the gain one can expect. Imagine the used car dealer who considers lying about a
car’s history of accidents to charge a higher price for the car (i.e., the gain). If the
lie is easily detected (e.g., if the car has bumps and scratches), the likelihood to
sell the car decreases. Consequently, the salesman will be honest.
A common assumption is that, rationally, deceiving for higher, rather than lower
gains is more bene cial. Surprisingly however, this is not what psychological
research  nds. People seem to cheat equally often when both high and low gains
are at play [7, 8, 9]. Research suggests that cheating does not only depend on
materialistic gains, but also on psychological costs that deception in icts on the
deceiver. On the one hand, deceiving for larger gains is more attractive than
deceiving for smaller gains. On the other hand, deceiving for larger gains carries
larger psychological costs [1, 10]. Psychological costs – the internal discomfort that
people experience when doing something against their beliefs or values –
depend on the magnitude of a lie [11]. In one experiment, participants were paid
according to the outcome they secretly rolled with a die. When asked about their
outcome, they were more likely to commit ‘smaller’ deceptions (i.e., reporting 5
instead of 4) than ‘bigger’ ones (reporting 6 instead of 1). Thus, it seems that the
psychological cost of telling a lie increase with the magnitude of the lie [11].
The psychological costs of a lie are closely linked to what one thinks about oneself.
In general, people want to think that they are honest. Telling big lies and
deceiving others is incompatible with this image [12]. Telling somewhat smaller
lies that are ‘almost true’ is easier to reconcile with a positive image of oneself
[11, 13]. Because generating a plausible justi cation for one’s lie (e.g., “I almost
rolled a 6 with my die”) is often a crucial part of deception, limiting people’s ability
to come up with explanations for their lying increases honesty [14]. Furthermore,
measures that highlight that one wants to be a good person increase subsequent
honesty. For example, signing on top of a self-report form (e.g., tax returns)
increases the attention to the moral self. Consequently, people cheat less when
completing the form [15]. In other words, the human desire to view oneself as a
moral person can be utilized to deter deception.
Taken together, people try to exploit others with black lies. Whether people
engage in black lies depends on whether something can be gained through the
deception, whether they will get caught, and whether psychological costs occur.
Yet, there is another important factor: the relationship with the deceived.
Research shows that cheating socially distant others is more acceptable [16].
However, people more frequently deceive close others [17]. A possible
explanation is that there is often more to gain from deceiving close others, and
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more to lose from revealing unpleasant truths. However, we suggest that this is
not the only reason. Deception is not only driven by exploitative motives but can
also result from a liative motives. Therefore, we next discuss cases of deception
that result from the motivation to forge a positive relationship with the deceived
or to please the deceived.
White lies
When motivated to a liate with or to please the deceived, the deceiver tries to
infer the intentions and attitudes of the deceived and communicates information
accordingly [18]. In some cases, this is very easy. When telling a friend that their
haircut looks great, it is obvious that this answer would please the friend, and the
truth would not. Also in other instances, people feel compelled to tell white lies.
People who respond to market research or health behavior questionnaires also
often try to give responses that please the person asking the question [19, 20].
Just like in the case of the friend’s haircut, it is easy to anticipate that the market
researcher would like to hear that you like their product, and that a health
researcher would like to hear that you eat vegetables.
Yet, telling white lies is not always that simple. How do responders in market
research and health surveys more generally infer which answers are expected or
desired by the interviewer? Research shows that deceivers rely on the rules and
principles of communication to make such judgments. According to these
principles, agreement (rather than disagreement) is expected in most everyday
communication [21]. We all intuitively understand this. For example, imagine you
want to invite a friend to your home for a spaghetti dinner. To be sure that your
friend likes spaghetti, you ask, “Do you like spaghetti?”, expecting a “Yes!”. Note
that, if you assume that your friend doesn’t like broccoli but you wanted to
double-check, you would ask the question di erently: “You don’t like broccoli, do
you?”, expecting a “No!”. If we expect “Yes!” answers, we typically ask more
common, positive questions (“Do you…?”), whereas if we expect “No!”, we ask less
common, negative questions (“You don’t…?”).
Responders who seek to give expected answers follow the same logic. Positive
questions [21] signal that “Yes” is an expected or appropriate answer. Thus,
people who want to please the person asking the question typically resort to
general agreement, for example by giving more “yes”-responses [22, 23]. Thereby,
a focus on the assumed intention of the person asking the question results in an
a rmative response bias [24]. Importantly, such an a rmative response bias can
unintentionally result in deception from purely a liative motives. In fact, recent
research highlights the a liative motive behind such deceptive communication
[25]. In these studies, participants agreed more with survey questions when
a liation was primed, for example by imagining that a friend, who is a likely target
of a liation, will read the answers. When primed with a liation, participants were
more likely to agree with di erent kinds of questions such as “If my brother or
sister fails, I feel responsible” or “I value being in good health above everything” [26].
Interestingly, participants showed the same tendency to agree when the
questions were about an average person (e.g., “The average person values being in
good health above everything”). In these cases, agreement conveys no desirable or
positive information about the deceiver, and there is no bene t to be gained
from such responding. Nevertheless, the deceiver responds in a way that
matches the expected answer of the deceived, to please the deceived.
Remarkably, deception in these instances occurs without any expectation of
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receiving a favor in return. People usually tell white lies because they expect
something from their counterpart (e.g., a positive relationship), but when primed
with a liation, people deceive even in cases when nothing can be expected from
the counterpart (i.e., the researcher).
The consequences of black lies and white lies
Now, we discuss how black lies and white lies a ect the deceiver, the deceived,
and third parties. Unsurprisingly, the literature shows that exploitative deception
for one’s own bene t harms or terminates the relationship between the deceiver
and the deceived [27]. A customer who discovers the used car dealer’s lies would
probably leave immediately. In contrast, a liative deception often entails positive
interpersonal outcomes [28]. In the case of pro-social lies that solely bene t
others, observers of the deception like and trust the deceiver more than they like
and trust an honest person [29]. An example of such a pro-social lie would be to
tell one’s boss that a colleague did great work, even if the work was only
mediocre. In such cases, telling the truth for the sake of being truthful is seen as
sel sh and less moral [29].
Are white lies then without any harm? Even when the motives behind deception
are purely a liative, the deceived as well as third parties might face negative
consequences. In the case of survey responding, the deceived researcher may
 nd false results, which could negatively a ect policies for third parties such as
the general public [25]. Ultimately, false research results waste taxpayer money
when, for example, public health programs to combat obesity or smoking build
on such false results. Even more concerning might be cases of a liative deception
in eyewitness interviews. In such situations, witnesses might want to help and
please the interrogator. When assuming that a rmation is the desired answer
[23], witnesses in doubt might respond with yes to questions, because they
assume that this is what the interrogator expects. In these cases, innocent third
parties might be convicted of crimes, although the deceiver had only a liative
intentions [30].
Given its negative consequences, much research has been dedicated to the
detection of black lies – see [31] for a comprehensive approach. Concerning the
detection of white lies, research has focused on the detection of socially
desirable responding [20, 24]. However, white lies also occur on neutral items
that convey no desirable information [25]. More research is needed to study how
such deception can be detected. One way to address the problem of white lies in
surveys could be using implicit measures that do not rely on explicit verbal
questions, or phrasing questions in neutral ways so that people cannot infer
which answer might be desired by the person asking the question. Nevertheless,
if you want to know whether your friend truly likes your new haircut, even from a
neutral question like “What do you think of my haircut?” will your friend probably
still infer that you want them to say something positive. 
Regarding the personal consequences for the deceiver, we have discussed how
telling black lies can be psychologically costly [11]. Research has not yet
investigated whether telling white lies also bears psychological costs for the
deceiver. For example, does giving a certain response in a survey to please a
researcher also threaten the deceiver’s honest self-image? Unlike in the cases of
deception due to exploitative motives, the perceived bene ts of a liative
deception may outweigh its costs. The positive feeling that results from thinking
that one has pleased the researcher might be stronger than the psychological
costs of having lied. Otherwise, it would be di cult to understand why people
engage in a liative deception at all. 
Whereas black lies are in many instances prevented through deterrence and
punishment (e.g., termination of a relationship), white lies are in contrast
assumed to be a necessary lubricant of daily interactions that does not need to
be prevented. After all, why prevent small  attering lies about a friend’s haircut?
However, we have pointed out above that some white lies can indeed have
negative consequences, for example by distorting the results of research in the
public interest. To prevent such white lies in order to facilitate public policy,
considering the above-mentioned psychological costs of deception could o er one
possibility to prevent deception. Deceivers might think that their a rmative
answers please market or health researchers, without in icting any costs on the
deceived. Thus, these researchers might, at the onset of their studies, make
explicit that their research is hurt even by well-meant deceptive answers.
Thereby, deceivers might become aware of the costs of their deception. People
might then refrain from a liative deception, thereby giving researchers more
accurate answers.
Another way to prevent exploitative deception is to highlight people’s moral image
of themselves (e.g., by signing before providing information) [15]. The question
25/05/2018 White lies and black lies: What they have in common and how they differ | Magazine issue 5/2018 - Issue 37 | In-Mind
http://www.in-mind.org/article/white-lies-and-black-lies-what-they-have-in-common-and-how-they-differ 5/6
arises whether this measure could also reduce a liative deception. Thereby,
emphasizing the moral self when responding to questionnaires could lead to
more accurate answers because people rather focus on their ethicality than on
what kind of answer please the researcher. Doing so could also increase
accuracy in market research or public health surveys.
Deception is part of everyday human interaction. Although the used car dealer
who is lying to clients might at  rst sight not have much in common with the
survey participant who mostly responds with “yes”, we argue that both cases are
examples of deception. Importantly, whereas we all immediately understand the
harm in telling black lies, also telling white lies can ultimately be harmful.
Notes
i We treat lying as one special case of deception, in which an untruth is stated
whereas deception can also take other forms, such as physically hiding something.
However, there is an ongoing debate about their relation [32].
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